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making it throughout the course of the proceeding.”2 “[T]o constitute a judicial admission it must 
not only be a formal statement of fact but must also be intentional, clear, and unambiguous.”3  
Judicial admissions arise under multiple circumstances, including within the language of 
a party’s pleadings, in motions for summary judgment, via admissions “in open court,” and 
through admissions that are specifically made in response to a request for admission.4 Without a 
party’s judicial admission, the “factual matter” in question would “otherwise requir[e] 
evidentiary proof.”5 Once the judicial admission withdraws a fact from contention, that fact 
“may not be controverted at trial or on appeal.”6  
Furthermore, judicial admissions may appear during any stage of the litigation, since the 
focus is on the statement itself and not the timeline of the proceedings.7 This may even extend as 
far as the appellate stages of litigation, where courts have found judicial admission language 
contained in appellate briefs.8  
II. Judicial Admissions Must be True Statements of Fact  
Courts have held that in order for a statement to qualify as a judicial admission, it must be 
a “statement of fact,” as opposed to a “legal argument made to [the] court.”9 One such example 
of a legal argument is a party’s interpretation of the language in a contract.10 Similarly, the court 
 
2 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 360. 
3 See id. at 361. 
4 See, e.g., Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1177–78 (11th Cir. 2009); In re McLain, 516 F.3d 301, 
309 (5th Cir. 2008); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1097–98 (10th Cir. 1991). 
5 See Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972). 
6 Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995). 
7 See Kohne v. Yost, 818 P.2d 360, 362 (Mont. 1991). 
8 See Postscript Enters. v. City of Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223, 227–28 (8th Cir. 1990). 
9 New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 159 F.3d 86, 97 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998). 
10 See In re Wansdown Properties Corp. N.V., 620 B.R. 487, 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020), rev’d on other 
grounds, No. 19-13223 (SMB), 2021 WL 116207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2021). 
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held that a partner’s statements concerning “the legal effect of certain transactions” could not 
constitute a judicial admission.11  
A judicial admission must also pertain to a true statement that represents reality.12 The 
court has noted the importance of truth and accuracy of the statements.13 In In re Motors 
Liquidation Co., the court was particularly troubled by the lower court’s allowance of a judicial 
admission where the “statement could not be true” due to its sole existence in a “superseded 
agreement and one that was never approved by the bankruptcy court.”14 The court was further 
concerned by the fact that documents filed on the same day featured inconsistencies that invited 
doubt as to their truth, and even noted the bankruptcy court’s acknowledgment that the citation 
of language from a non-operative agreement was “‘plainly’ a mistake.”15  
III. A Statement must meet Formality and Conclusiveness Standards to Qualify as a 
Judicial Admission 
 
Additionally, a statement should have “sufficient formality or conclusiveness to be a 
judicial admission.”16 When assessing whether there is sufficient formality to be considered a 
judicial admission, courts have considered the context surrounding the statement and the channel 
where the statement was made. The Second Circuit has categorized language that “appeared in 
both an answer and notice of removal” as sufficiently formal and conclusive.17 However, an 
attorney’s comments to the jury did not meet the standard for “sufficient formality or 
conclusiveness.”18  
 
11 Meehancombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Master Fund, LP v. Caesars Ent. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 3d 200, 212 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
12 Cf. PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Of course, the parties may not 
create a case by stipulating to facts which do not really exist.”). 
13 See, e.g., Pillars v. GM LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 957 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2020). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir. 1965). 
17 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 361. 
18 Berner v. Brit. Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d at 542. 
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IV. A Statement must also be Deliberate, Clear and Unambiguous 
 
Recently, the Second Circuit found that a judicial admission also requires a statement to 
be “deliberate, clear and unambiguous.”19 This standard is in accordance with multiple other 
circuit courts. 20 To satisfy this standard, a movant has a high burden.21  
As a result of the high burden for a judicial admission, a “plain mistake” of fact will not 
be deemed an admission.22 In Western Insurance Co., the court considered whether the party 
claimed to have made a judicial admission “moved to amend its amended answer” or “claim 
fraud or mistake,” which might add doubt to its deliberateness.23 A court has discretion where it 
determines that “an honest mistake has been made,” and may “relieve [a] party of [an] otherwise 
binding consequence.”24  
With respect to unambiguous statements, courts have found that such statements must be 
“unequivocal.”25 Where a statement, part of a statement, or meaning of a word hinges on 
multiple interpretations, courts have found such statements to be ambiguous and not 
“unequivocal.”26 In Crosby, a wrongful death suit involving an underage driver, the court 
examined the multiple outcomes that could result from a minor’s statement that she “permitted” 
 
19 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 360. 
20 See id. (“Today we join our sister circuits and hold that in order for a statement to constitute a judicial admission it 
must not only be a formal statement of fact but must also be intentional, clear, and unambiguous.”); see also Choice 
Escrow and Land Title, LLC v. BancorpSouth Bank, 754 F.3d 611, 625 (8th Cir. 2014); Fraternal Order of Police 
Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s County, MD, 608 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); Robinson v. McNeil Consumer 
Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 872 (7th Cir. 2010). 
21 See Collins v. Putt, 979 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-920, 2021 WL 769716 (U.S. Mar. 1, 
2021) (Menashi, J., concurring) (referring to the “intentional, clear, and unambiguous” requirements as a “high 
standard”).  
22 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 360 (citing Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 
122 (2d Cir. 1990) as a counterexample). 
23 Western World Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 122. 
24 Triumph Const. Corp. V. New York City Council of Carpenters Pension Fund, 29 F.Supp.3d 373, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
25 See, e.g., Matter of Corland Corp., 967 F.2d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1992) (using the “deliberate, clear, and 
unequivocal” language) (emphasis added); see also Crosby v. Hummell, 63 P.3d 1022, 1027–28 (Alaska 2003). 
26 See Crosby, 63 P.3d at 1026–28. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
another to drive the car.27 Because the word “permitted” was “susceptible to more than one 
meaning” in this case, and as such, various interpretations of the statement would produce 
opposite outcomes under the state law, the court held that it was “not an unequivocal statement 
of fact and therefore [did] not qualify as a judicial admission.”28  
New York district courts have accordingly followed the Second Circuit’s new 
“deliberate, clear, and unambiguous” standard. The Southern District of New York held that a 
videotape referenced in an interrogatory was a judicial admission when a defendant referred 
directly to the videotape, relying on the tri-pronged criteria adopted by the Second Circuit.29 The 
Southern District also relied on the same three conditions when it ruled that uncontested 
language featured in an amended complaint regarding a worker’s role in a kitchen and his duties 
constituted a “formal judicial admission.”30  
Conclusion 
In determining whether a statement is a judicial admission, courts will consider the 
context and avenue of the statements, the intent of the parties, and whether the statements were 
truthful. The “deliberate, clear, and unambiguous” language seems to have solidified a slightly 
higher standard within the Second Circuit and has clarified that judicial admissions must be 
intended by the parties and that their meaning should be readily interpreted.  
 
 
27 See id. 
28 See id; see also Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 61 F. App'x 816, 819 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“An unequivocal statement is one that . . . expresses only one meaning.”). 
29 See Shim-Larkin v. City of New York, No. 16CV6099AJNKNF, 2020 WL 5534928, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 
2020) (quoting In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d at 360–61) (“[I]n order for a statement to constitute a judicial 
admission it must not only be a formal statement of fact but must also be intentional, clear, and unambiguous.”). 
30 Cox v. German Kitchen Ctr. LLC, No. 17CV6081GBDKNF, 2020 WL 5235748, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2020).  
 
